Does Adversarial Transferability Indicate Knowledge Transferability? by Liang, Kaizhao et al.
Does Adversarial Transferability Indicate Knowledge
Transferability?
Kaizhao Liang∗
Department of Computer Science
University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign
Champaign, IL 61801
kl2@illinois.edu
Jacky Y. Zhang∗
Department of Computer Science
University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign
Champaign, IL 61801
yiboz@illinois.edu
Oluwasanmi Koyejo
Department of Computer Science
University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign
Champaign, IL 61801
sanmi@illinois.edu
Bo Li
Department of Computer Science
University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign
Champaign, IL 61801
lbo@illinois.edu
Abstract
Despite the immense success that deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved,
adversarial examples, which are perturbed inputs that aim to mislead DNNs to
make mistakes, have recently led to great concern. On the other hand, adversarial
examples exhibit interesting phenomena, such as adversarial transferability. DNNs
also exhibit knowledge transfer, which is critical to improving learning efficiency
and learning in domains that lack high-quality training data. In this paper, we aim
to turn the existence and pervasiveness of adversarial examples into an advantage.
Given that adversarial transferability is easy to measure while it can be challenging
to estimate the effectiveness of knowledge transfer, does adversarial transferability
indicate knowledge transferability? We first theoretically analyze the relationship
between adversarial transferability and knowledge transferability and outline eas-
ily checkable sufficient conditions that identify when adversarial transferability
indicates knowledge transferability. In particular, we show that composition with
an affine function is sufficient to reduce the difference between two models when
adversarial transferability between them is high. We provide empirical evaluation
for different transfer learning scenarios on diverse datasets, including CIFAR-10,
STL-10, CelebA, and Taskonomy-data – showing a strong positive correlation be-
tween the adversarial transferability and knowledge transferability, thus illustrating
that our theoretical insights are predictive of practice.
1 Introduction
Knowledge transferability, also known as learning transferability, has attracted extensive study in
machine learning. Long before it was formally defined, the computer vision community has exploited
it to perform important visual manipulations [30], such as style transfer and super-resolution, where
pretrained VGG networks [63] are utilized to encode images into semantically meaningful features.
After the release of ImageNet [56], pretrained ImageNet models (e.g., on TensorFlow Hub or PyTorch-
Hub) has quickly become the default option for the transfer source, because of its broad coverage of
visual concepts and compatibility with various visual tasks [26]. Numerous visual tasks, especially
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Figure 1: A simple illustration of the relationship between adversarial and knowledge transferability.
the ones whose annotations are expensive to obtain, rely heavily on having a good pretrained model.
However, a recent study shows that the ImageNet models are not only unrobust against noise but also
biased towards textures [14]. Simultaneously, as more and more datasets are published, more and
more tasks are formulated. It is dauntingly difficult to brute-force evaluating all of them in search of
the optimal pretrained model – since there is no effective measurement of knowledge transferability
in practice. Therefore, now more than ever, we urgently need a method that can efficiently measure
and identify promising candidates from the increasingly large pool of pretrained models.
Here is where the adversarial transferability comes to the rescue. It is discovered that neural networks
are susceptible to adversarial examples, and more intriguingly, these adversarial examples can not
only target the model they are generated from but also affect other models [16, 51]. This phenomenon
is called adversarial transferability, which is extensively exploited to inspire black-box attacks[27, 38].
Many theoretical analyses have been conducted to establish the sufficient conditions of adversarial
transferability [8, 44]. Despite their malicious potential, some observations indicate that an adversarial
example can reveal the vital properties of neural networks [28]. It reflects hidden cues important for
decision-making, that are otherwise imperceptible for the mortal eyes. Besides, it is usually easier
to measure the adversarial transferability between two models by generating adversarial examples
directly than fine-tuning. This inspires us to investigate the underlying relation between adversarial
transferability and knowledge transferability. We aim to leverage the adversarial transferability as a
surrogate to approximate the knowledge transfer behavior as shown in Figure 1. We believe this will
lead to an efficient knowledge transfer mechanism.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to show that adversarial transferability indicates
knowledge transferability both theoretically and empirically2. Our main contributions follow.
• We formally define two quantities, τ1 and τ2, to measure adversarial transferability from
different aspects, which for the first time enables in-depth understanding of adversarial
transferability from a geometric point of view in the feature representation space.
• We derive an upper bound for knowledge transferability with respect to adversarial transfer-
ability. We rigorously depict their underlying relation and show that adversarial transferabil-
ity can indicate knowledge transferability.
• We conduct thorough controlled experiments for diverse knowledge transfer scenarios
(e.g. knowledge transfer among data distributions, attributes, and tasks) on benchmark
datasets including STL-10, CIFAR-10, CelebA, and Taskonomy-data. Our empirical results
show strong positive correlation between adversarial and knowledge transferability, which
validates our theoretical conclusions.
Related work. Knowledge transferability has been widely applied in scenarios where the available
data for certain domain or task is limited, and has achieved great success [73, 77, 75, 33, 45, 10].
Several studies have been conducted to understand the reasons and factors that affect knowledge
transferability [80, 41, 76, 79, 62]. Empirical observations show that the correlation between learning
tasks [1, 82], the similarity of model architectures, and data distribution are all correlated with
different knowledge transfer effects. However, a more effective indicator of knowledge transferability
is required to quantitatively understand its effectiveness or feasibility in a computational realistic way
even before one conducts the expensive training and fine-tuning process.
Adversarial Transferability has been observed by several works [51, 16, 31]. Since the early work, a
2Code available at https://github.com/AI-secure/Does-Adversairal-Transferability-Indicate-Knowledge-Transferability
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lot of studies have been conducted, aiming to further understand the phenomenon and design more
transferable adversarial attacks. Regardless of the threat model, a lot of attack methods have been
proposed to boost adversarial transferability [84, 8, 11, 78]. Naseer et al. [48] propose to produce
adversarial examples that transfer cross-domain via a generative adversarial network. In addition to
the efficacy, efficiency [27] and practicality [52] are also optimized. Beyond the above empirical
studies, there is some work dedicated to analyzing this phenomenon, showing different conditions
that may enhance adversarial transferability [2, 70, 44, 8]. Building upon these observations, it is
clear that there exist certain connections between adversarial transferability and other knowledge
transfer scenarios, and here we aim to provide the first theoretic justification to verify it and design
systematic empirical studies to measure such correlation.
2 Adversarial Transferability vs. Knowledge Transferability
In this section, we establish connections between adversarial examples and knowledge transferability
rigorously. We first formally state the problem studied in this section. Then, we move on to
subsection 2.1 to introduce two metrics that encode information about adversarial attacks. Finally, we
present our theoretical results about the relationship between adversarial and knowledge transferability
in subsection 2.2.
Notation. We use blackboard bold to denote sets, e.g., R. We use calligraphy to denote distributions,
e.g., D. The support of a distribution D is denoted as supp(D). We use bold lower case letters to
denote vectors, e.g., x ∈ Rn. We use bold uppercase letter to denote a matrix, e.g.,A. We useA† to
denote the Moore–Penrose inverse of matrix A. We use ◦ to denote the composition of functions,
i.e., g ◦ f(x) = g(f(x)). We use ‖ · ‖2 to denote Euclidean norm induced by standard inner product
〈·, ·〉. Given a function f , we use f(x) to denote its evaluated value at x, and we use f to represent
this function in function space. We use 〈·, ·〉D to denote inner product induced by distribution D,
i.e., 〈f1, f2〉D = Ex∼D〈f1(x), f2(x)〉. Accordingly, we use ‖ · ‖D to denote a norm induced by
inner product 〈·, ·〉D, i.e., ‖f‖D =
√〈f, f〉D. For a matrix function F : supp(D) → Rd×m, we
define its L2(D)-norm in accordance with matrix 2-norm as ‖F‖D,2 =
√
Ex∼D‖F (x)‖22. We define
projection operator proj(·, r) to project a matrix to a hyperball of spectral norm radius r, i.e.,
proj(A, r) =
{
A, if ‖A‖2 ≤ r
rA/‖A‖2 if ‖A‖2 > r .
Setting. Assume we are given a target problem defined by data distribution x ∼ D, where x ∈ Rn,
and y : Rn → Rd represent the ground truth labeling function. As a first try, a reference model
fT : Rn → Rd trained on the target dataset is obtained through optimizing over a function class
fT ∈ FT . Now suppose we have a source model fS : Rn → Rm pretrained on source data, and we
are curious how fS transfer to the target data D?
Knowledge transferability. Given a trainable function g : Rm → Rd, where g ∈ G is from a small
function class for efficiency purpose, we care about whether fS can achieve low loss L(·; y,D), e.g.,
mean squared error, after stacking with a trainable function g comparing with fT , i.e.,
min
g∈G
L(g ◦ fS ; y,D) compare with L(fT ; y,D).
Clearly, the solution to this optimization problem depends on the choice of G. We only consider the
class of affine functions, which is commonly used in practice. Formally, the problem that is studied
in our theory is stated as follows.
Problem 1. Given a reference model fT trained on target distribution D, and a source model fS
pre-trained on source data. Can we predict the best possible performance of the composite function
g◦fS onD, where g is from a bounded affine function class, given adversarial transferability between
fS and fT ?
2.1 Adversarial Transferability
We use the `2-norm to characterize the effectiveness of an attack.
Definition 1 (Virtual Adversarial Attack [46]). Given a model f : Rn → Rd, the attack on point x
within -ball is defined as argmax‖δ‖≤ ‖f(x) − f(x + δ)‖2. As this is intractable in practice, we
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consider the use of the tangent function to approximate the difference:
δf,(x) = arg max
‖δ‖≤
‖∇f(x)>δ‖2,
where ∇f(x) ∈ Rn×d is the Jacobian matrix. The  will be dropped in clear context or when it is
irrelevant.
To provide a quantitative view of adversarial transferability, we measure it with two metrics τ1 and
τ2, defined as follows. Both metrics are in the range of [0, 1], where higher values indicate more
adversarial transferability.
Definition 2 (Adversarial Transferability (Angle)). Given two function f1, f2, we assume they have
the same input dimension, and may have different output dimensions. The Adversarial Transferability
(Angle) of f1 and f2 at point x is defined as the squared cosine value of the angle between the two
attacks, i.e.,
τ1(x) =
〈δf1(x), δf2(x)〉2
‖δf1(x)‖22 · ‖δf2(x)‖22
.
We denote its expected value as τ1 = Ex∼D[τ1(x)].
Intuitively, τ1 characterizes the similarity of the two attacks. The higher the cosine similarity, the
better they can be attacked together. However, it is not sufficient to fully characterize how good fS
will perform only knowing the angle of two attack directions. For example, it is possible that the two
functions have the same gradient direction but different gradient norms everywhere, which makes it
impossible for knowledge transfer.
Therefore, we also need information about deviation of a function given attacks. We denote the
deviation of a function f , given attack δ(x), as f(x+δ(x))−f(x), and we define its approximation
as
∆f,δ(x) = ∇f(x)>δ(x). (1)
Accordingly, we define another metric to answer the following question: applying f1’s adversarial
attacks on both the models, how much can the deviation of their function value be aligned by affine
transformations?
Definition 3 (Adversarial Transferability (Deviation)). Given two functions f1, f2 with the same input
dimensions and potentially different output dimensions, the Adversarial Transferability (Deviation)
of adversarial attacks from f1 to f2 given data distribution D is defined as
τf1→f22 =
〈2∆f2,δf1 −A∆f1,δf1 ,A∆f1,δf1 〉D
‖∆f2,δf1‖2D
,
whereA is a constant matrix defined as
A = proj(Ex∼D[∆f2,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)
>]
(
Ex∼D[∆f1,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)
>]
)†
,
‖∆f2,δf1‖D
‖∆f1,δf1‖D
).
To have better sense of τ2 and the relationships with other quantities, we present a simple example
for visual illustration in Figure 2. Note that high τ2 does not necessarily require ∆f1,δf1 and ∆f2,δf1
to be the same, but they are similar in the sense of being linearly transformable. We refer to the proof
of Proposition 1 at section B in appendix for detailed explanation of τ2.
Proposition 1. Both τ1 and τ2 are in [0, 1].
2.2 Adversarial Transfearbility Indicating Knowledge Transferability
In this subsection, we will provide our theoretical results. First, to have a better intuition, we will
show a special case where the theorems are simplified, i.e., where fS and fT are both Rn → R.
Then, we present the general case where fS and fT are multi-dimensional. Note that their output
dimensions are not necessarily the same.
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Figure 2: Illustration of all the vari-
ables in a case where both f1, f2
are Rn → R, and both attacks
δf1(x), δf2(x) are of unit length.
When fS and fT are both Rn → R, the τ1 and τ2 come out in
a surprisingly elegant form. Let us show what the two metrics
are to have further intuition on what τ1 and τ2 characterize.
First, let us see what the attack is in this case. As function f
has one-dimensional output, its gradient is a vector∇f ∈ Rn.
Thus,
δf,(x) = arg max
‖δ‖≤
‖∇f(x)>δ‖2 = ∇f(x)‖∇f(x)‖2
is simply the gradient with its scale normalized. Then, the τ1
becomes
τ1(x) =
〈∇fS(x),∇fT (x)〉2
‖∇fS(x)‖22 · ‖∇fT (x)‖22
,
which is the squared cosine (angle) between two gradients. For τ2, the matrix A degenerates to a
scalar constant, which makes τ2 simpler as well, i.e.,
A =
〈∆fT ,δfS ,∆fS ,δfS 〉D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D
, and τfS→fT2 =
〈∆fS ,δfS ,∆fT ,δfS 〉2D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D · ‖∆fT ,δfS ‖2D
.
We can see, in this case τ2 is interestingly in the same form of the first metric τ1. We will simply use
τ2 to denote τ
fS→fT
2 afterwards.
Accordingly, when fS and fT are both Rn → R, the result also comes out in an elegant form. In this
case, adversarial attacks reflect all the information of the gradients of the two models, enabling τ1
and τ2 to encode all the information we need to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For two functions fS and fT that both are Rn → R, there is an affine function g : R→ R,
such that
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D = Ex∼D
[
(1− τ1(x)τ2)‖∇fT (x)‖22
]
,
where g(x) = Ax+Const. Moreover, if assuming that fT is L-Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,‖∇fT (x)‖2 ≤
L for ∀x ∈ supp(D), we have a more elegant statement:
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D ≤ (1− τ1τ2)L2.
The theorem suggests that, if adversarial transferability is high, there exists an affine transformation
with bounded norm, such that g ◦ fS is close to fT . As an intuition of the proof, the difference
between two gradients can be represented by the angle between them, which can be characterized by
τ1; and the norm difference between them, which can be characterized by τ2.
Similar to the general case, we consider when the output dimensions of both functions are multi-
dimensional and not necessarily the same. In this scenario, adversarial attacks correspond to the
largest singular value of the Jacobian matrix. Therefore, we need to introduce the following definition
to capture other information that is not revealed by adversarial attacks.
Definition 4 (Singular Value Ratio). For any function f , the Singular Value Ratio for the function
gradient at x is defined as λf (x) = σ2(x)σ1(x) , where σ1(x), σ2(x) are the largest and the second largest
singular value in absolute value of∇f(x), respectively. In addition, we define the worst-case singular
value ratio as λf = maxx∈supp(D) λf (x).
Theorem 2. For two functions fS : Rn → Rm, and fT : Rn → Rd, assuming that fT is L-Lipschitz
continuous, i.e., ‖∇fT (x)‖2 ≤ L for ∀x ∈ supp(D), there is an affine function g : Rm → Rd, such that
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D ≤
(
(1− τ1τ2) + (1− τ1)(1− τ2)λ2fT + (λfT + λfS )2
)
5L2,
where g is defined as g(z) = Az +Const.
Note that, as Theorem 1, this theorem also has a statement offering tighter bound where we do not
assume Lipschitz continuous. The full version of this theorem is provided in appendix. What we
have now is a bound on the norms of the gradients. Intuitively, given the right constant value shift,
minimal difference in gradients implies minimal difference in function value, which should result in
bounded loss. Indeed, we prove that the squared loss of the transferred model g ◦ fS is bounded by
the loss of fT and their gradient difference, by assuming the β-smoothness of both the functions.
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Definition 5 (β-smoothness). A function f is β-smooth if for all x,y,
‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖2 ≤ β‖x− y‖2.
For the target data distribution D, and its ground truth labeling function y, the mean squared loss of
the transferred model is Ex∼D‖g ◦ fS(x)− y(x)‖22 = ‖g ◦ fS − y‖2D. Therefore, the following theorem
presents upper bound on the mean squared loss of the transferred model.
Theorem 3. Without loss of generality we assume ‖x‖2 ≤ 1 for ∀x ∈ supp(D). Consider functions
fS : Rn → Rm, fT : Rn → Rd, and an affine function g : Rm → Rd, suggested by Theorem 1 or
Theorem 2, with the constant set to let g(fS(0)) = fT (0). If both fT , fS are β-smooth, then
‖g ◦ fS − y‖2D ≤
(
‖fT − y‖D + ‖∇fT −∇g ◦ fS‖D +
(
1 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2
)
β
)2
.
3 Characterizing the Knowledge and Adversarial Transferability
Efforts on searching for proper inductive bias can be dated back to the dawn of AI, when Turing argues
to use learning elements to construct intelligent systems, instead of building them from the scratch [71].
This idea has had a profound impact and quickly metamorphosized into various forms, including
but not limited to, Bayesian inference [36, 69, 68, 17, 18], Few-shot Learning [66, 59, 12, 49, 64],
Domain Adaptation [24, 42, 74, 72] and Transfer Learning [53, 6, 85, 43, 50, 7, 67]. In this section,
we first summarize the categories of knowledge transferability and then provide a measure for
adversarial transferability as a proxy of knowledge transferability in practice.
3.1 Categories of Knowledge Transferability
Transfer Learning focuses on applying the knowledge gained from one problem to another. Specifi-
cally, two approaches are most concerned. First, Direct-transfer: only the new output layers’ weights
are updated, whereas the rest of the network is frozen; Second, Fine-tuning: all weights of the model
are updated based on the target problem. To measure the knowledge transferability quantitatively, we
follow the convention by computing the final loss of the transferred models [61, 3, 43]. We measure
how well adversarial transferability indicates the knowledge transferability in the following scenarios.
Knowledge-transfer among data distributions is the most common setting of transfer learning. It
transfers the knowledge of a model trained/gained from one data domain to the other data domains.
For instance, Shiel et al. [60] manage to use pre-trained ImageNet representations to achieve state-
of-the-art accuracy for medical data analysis. Furthermore, Huh et al. [26] and Kornblith et al. [34]
investigate the reasons and conditions for ImageNet to be a good transfer source.
Knowledge-transfer among attributes is a popular method to handle zero-shot and few-shot learn-
ing problems [29, 55, 81]. It transfers the knowledge learned from the attributes of the source
problem to a new target problem. For instance, Russakovsky et al. [57] build a large scale dataset
with attributes to facilitate zero-shot object recognition. Kankuekul et al. [32] even demonstrate that
attribute transfer can be done in an online manner.
Knowledge-transfer among tasks is widely applied across various vision tasks, such as super resolu-
tion [30], style transfer [13], semantic and instance segmentation [15, 20, 40]. It involves transfering
the knowledge the model gains by learning to do one task to another novel task. Although there
are doubts [19, 54] about the efficacy of pre-training, it is still the predominant way of getting good
performance when the training data of the new task is scarce. Thus, many recent works [1, 65, 82]
are dedicated to charting the affinity map between tasks, aiming to guide potential transfer.
3.2 Measurement of Adversarial Transferability
Existing studies have shown that models trained on the same data distribution and architectures share
high adversarial transferability [38, 51, 70]. Heo et al. [22] even propose to map function’s decision
boundary with adversarial examples empirically. Therefore it is natural to ask: do the models trained
on similar but not identical data or tasks still share high adversarial transferability? To answer this
question, we need a generic attack method that can be used to estimate the adversarial transferability
between models. However, the optimization problem in Definition 1 is practically hard to solve. So
we approximate this process by the effective attack approach PGD [35] with random re-starts.
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We measure the adversarial transferability based on PGD attacks in practice. PGD attack is generated
iteratively: denote step size as ξ, the source model as fS , and the loss function on the source problem.
`S(·, ·). We initialize x0 to be uniformly sampled from the -ball B(x) of radius  centered as
instance x, and then generate the adversarial instance iteratively: at step t we compute xt+1 =
xt + ξ · sign(∇xt`S(fS(xt), fS(x))). Denoting the adversarial example at instance x using PGD on
source model fS as PGDfS (x), we measure the empirical adversarial transferability from fS to fT
based on the loss `T (·, y) of fT on target data D given attacks generated on fS , i.e.,
LT (fT ◦ PGDfS ; y,D) = Ex∼D `T (fT (PGDfS (x)), y(x)). (2)
In the following, we show its connection with the adversarial transferability defined in our theory.
Proposition 2. If LT is mean squared loss, fT achieves zero loss, and the attack recovers the virtual
adversarial attack within an small -ball (Definition 1), the empirical adversarial transferability
defined in (2) is approximately upper and lower bounded by
LT (fT ◦ PGDfS ; y,D) ≥ 2Ex∼D
[
τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22
]
+O(3),
LT (fT ◦ PGDfS ; y,D) ≤ 2Ex∼D
[(
λ2fT + (1− λ2fT )τ1(x)
) ‖∇fT (x)‖22]+O(3),
where O(3) denotes a cubic error term. We can see that as τ1(x) becomes larger, both bounds
become larger, i.e., τ1 and the empirical adversarial transferability are positively correlated.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we will describe the empirical evaluation of the relationship between adversarial
transferability and knowledge transferability in three knowledge transfer scenarios: knowledge
transfer on data distributions, attributes, and tasks. Each of the experiments will be presented and
discussed in this order. All training details are deferred to the Appendix.
4.1 Adversarial Transferability Indicates Knowledge-transfer among Data Distributions
Figure 3: (left): correlation between the adversarial transferability and knowledge trransferability.
(right): models with higher adversarial transferability converge faster in fine-tuning.
This experiment shows that the closer the source data distribution is to the target data distribution, the
more adversarially transferable the source model to the reference model, thus we observe that the
source model is more knowledge transferable to the target dataset.
Dataset. We manually construct five source datasets (5 source models) based on CIFAR-10 [23] and
a single target dataset (1 reference model) based on STL-10 [5]. We divide the classes of the original
datasets into two categories, animals (bird, cat, deer, dog) and transportation vehicles (airplane,
automobile, ship, truck). Each of the source datasets consists of different a percentage of animals and
transportation vehicles, while the target dataset contains only transportation vehicles, which is meant
to control the closeness of the two data distributions.
Adversarial Transferability. We take 1000 test images (STL-10) from the target dataset and
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generate 1000 adversarial examples on each of the five source models with virtual adversarial attacks
as described in section 3. The choices of  (i.e., the L∞ norm bound) include 0.03, 0.06, 0.1, 0.2. For
PGD based attacks, we only run 10 steps for efficiency. We measure the transfer effectiveness of the
adversarial examples by computing the cross-entropy loss on the reference model.
Knowledge Transferability. To measure the knowledge transferability, we fine-tune a new linear
layer on the target dataset to replace the last layer of each source model to generate the corresponding
transferred models. Then we measure the performance of the five transferred models on the target
dataset based on the standard accuracy and cross-entropy loss.
Results From figure 3 (left), it is clear that the source models trained on a higher percentage of
vehicles (target domain) demonstrate higher adversarial transferability and thus higher knowledge
transferability. This makes intuitive sense, since the target dataset consists of only vehicles. In
addition, the models of higher adversarial transferability (figure 3 right) also converge faster in
fine-tuning, indicating easier knowledge transfer training.
4.2 Adversarial Transferability Indicating Knowledge-transfer among Attributes
Figure 4: Top 5 Attributes with the highest adversarial trans-
ferability and their corresponding performance on each of the
validation benchmarks. The adv transferability is normalized
to range [0,1] by dividing the largest value. Attributes with
lower adversarial transferability observe lower knowledge
transferability from the left to right.
In addition to the data distributions,
we validate our theory on another
dimension, attributes. This experi-
ment suggests that the more adversar-
ially transferable the source model of
certain attributes is to the reference
model, the better the model performs
on the target task aiming to learn tar-
get attributes.
Dataset CelebA [39] consists of
202,599 face images from 10,177
identities. A reference facial recog-
nition model is trained on this identi-
ties. Each image also comes with 40
binary attributes, on which we train
40 source models. Our goal is to test
whether source models of source at-
tributes, can transfer to perform facial
recognition.
Adversarial Transferability We sample 1000 images from CelebA and perform a virtual adversarial
attack as described in section 3 on each of the 40 attribute classifiers. Then we measure the adversarial
transfer effectiveness of these adversarial examples on the reference facial recognition model.
Knowledge Transferability To fairly assess the knowledge transferability, we test the 40 transferred
models on 7 well-known facial recognition benchmarks, LFW [25], CFP-FF, CFP-FP [58], AgeDB
[47], CALFW, CPLFW [83] and VGG2-FP [4]. We report the classification accuracy separately for
each of the target datasets.
Result In figure 4, we list the top-5 attribute source models that share the highest adversarial transfer-
ability and the performance of their transferred models on the 7 target facial recognition benchmarks.
We observe that the attribute "Young" has the highest adversarial transferability; as a result, it also
achieves highest classification performance in 5 out of the 7 benchmarks, while performing decently
well in the rest of the 2.
4.3 Adversarial Transferability Indicating Knowledge-transfer among Tasks
In this experiment, we aim to show that adversarial transferability can also indicate the knolwdge
transferability among different machine learning tasks. Zamir et al. [82] shows that models trained
on different tasks can transfer to other tasks well, especially when the tasks belong to the same
“category". Here we leverage the same dataset, and pick 15 single image tasks from the task pool,
including Autoencoding, 2D Segmentation, 3D Keypoint and etc. Intuitively, these tasks can be
categorized into 3 categories, semantic task, 2D tasks as well as 3D tasks. Leveraging the tasks within
the same category, which would hypothetically have higher adversarial transferability, we evaluate
the corresponding knowledge transferability.
Dataset The Taskonomy-data [82] consists of 4 million images of indoor scenes from about 600
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Figure 5: Left: Emprically confirmed taskonomy prediction of task categories [82]. Right: Task
category prediction based on adversarial transferability. Different colors represent different task
categories including 2D, 3D, Semantic. It is obvious that the adversarial transferability is able to
predict similar task categories aligned with the pure knowledge-transfer empirical observation.
indoor images, every one of which has annotations for every task listed in the pool. We use a public
subset[82] of these images to validate our theory.
Adversarial Transferability Adversarial Transferability Matrix (ATM) is used here to measure
the adversarial transferability between multiple tasks, modified from the Affinity Matrix in [82].
Detailed definition is deferred to the Appendix. To generate the corresponding “task categories" for
comparison, we sample 1000 images from the public dataset and perform a virtual adversarial attack
on each of the 15 source models. Adversarial perturbation with  (L∞ norm) as 0.03,0.06 are used
and we run 10 steps PGD-based attack for efficiency. Then we measure these adversarial examples’
effectiveness on each of the 15 tasks by the corresponding loss functions. After we obtain the 15×15
ATM, we take columns of this matrix as features for each task and perform agglomerative clustering
to obtain the Task Similarity Tree.
Knowledge Transferability We use the affinity scores provided as a 15× 15 affinity matrix by [82]
to compute the categories of tasks. Then we take columns of this matrix as features for each task and
perform agglomerative clustering to obtain the Task Similarity Tree.
Result Figure 5 compares the predictions of task categories generated based on adversarial transfer-
ability and knowledge transferability in [82]. It is easy to see three intuitive categories are formed,
i.e, 2D, 3D, and Semantic tasks for both adversarial and knowledge transferability. To provide a
quantitative measurement of the similarity, we also compute the average inner category entropy based
on adversarial transferability with the categories in [82] as the ground truth (the lower entropy indi-
cates higher correlation between adversarial and knowledge transferability). In figure 6 (Appendix),
the adversarial transferability based category prediction shows low entropy when the number of
categories is greater or equal to 3, which indicates that the adversarial tranferability is faithful with
the category prediction in [82]. This result shows strong positive correlation between the adversarial
transferability and knowledge transferability among learning tasks in terms of predicting the similar
task categories.
5 Conclusion
We theoretically analyze the relationship between adversarial transferability and knowledge transfer-
ability, along with thorough experimental justifications in diverse scenarios. Both our theoretical and
empirical results show that adversarial transferability can indicate knowledge transferability, which
opens up a new door for assessing and enhancing knowledge-based transfer learning. To further
effectively evaluate the adversarial transferability, one possible future direction would be to identify
promising pretrained models as reference models, without the overhead of training from scratch.
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A Discussion about Validness of the Notations
Before starting proving our theory, it is necessary to show that our mathematical tools are indeed
valid. It is easy to verify that 〈·, ·〉D is a valid inner product inherited form standard Euclidean inner
product. Therefore, the norm ‖ · ‖D, induced by the inner product, is also a valid norm.
What does not come directly is the validness of the norm ‖ · ‖D,2. Particularly, whether it satisfies
the triangle inequality. Recall that, for a function of matrix output F : supp(D) → Rd×m, its
L2(D)-norm in accordance with matrix 2-norm is defined as
‖F‖D,2 =
√
Ex∼D‖F (x)‖22.
For two functions F,G, both are supp(D)→ Rd×m, we can verify the norm ‖ · ‖D,2 satisfies triangle
inequality as shown in the following. Applying the triangle inequality of the spectral norm, and with
some algebra manipulation, it holds that
‖F +G‖D,2 =
√
Ex∼D‖F (x) +G(x)‖22
≤
√
Ex∼D (‖F (x)‖2 + ‖G(x)‖2)2
=
√
Ex∼D‖F (x)‖22 + Ex∼D‖G(x)‖22 + 2Ex∼D‖F (x)‖2‖G(x)‖2
=
√
‖F‖2D,2 + ‖G‖2D,2 + 2Ex∼D‖F (x)‖2‖G(x)‖2. (3)
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can see that
Ex∼D‖F (x)‖2‖G(x)‖2 ≤
√
Ex∼D‖F (x)‖22 · Ex∼D‖G(x)‖22
= ‖F‖D,2 · ‖G‖D,2.
Plugging this into (3) would complete the proof, i.e.,
(3) ≤
√
‖F‖2D,2 + ‖G‖2D,2 + 2‖F‖D,2 · ‖G‖D,2
=
√
(‖F‖D,2 + ‖G‖D,2)2
= ‖F‖D,2 + ‖G‖D,2.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 (Restated). Both τ1 and τ2 are in [0, 1].
Proof. We are to prove that τ1 and τ2 are both in the range of [0, 1]. As τ1 is squared cosine, it is
trivial that τ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, we will focus on τ2 in the following.
Recall that the τ2 from f1 to f2 is defined as
τf1→f22 =
〈2∆f2,δf1 −A∆f1,δf1 ,A∆f1,δf1 〉D
‖∆f2,δf1‖2D
,
whereA is a constant matrix defined as
A = proj(Ex∼D[∆f2,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)
>]
(
Ex∼D[∆f1,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)
>]
)†
,
‖∆f2,δf1 ‖D
‖∆f1,δf1 ‖D
).
For notation convenience, we will simply use τ2 to denote τ
f1→f2
2 in this proof.
τ2 characterizes how similar are the changes in both the function values of f1 : Rn → Rm and
f2 : Rn → Rd in the sense of linear transformable, given attack generated on f1. That is being said,
it is associated to the function below, i.e,
h(B) =
∥∥∆f2,δf1 −B∆f1,δf1∥∥2D = Ex∼D ∥∥∆f2,δf1 (x)−B∆f1,δf1 (x)∥∥22 ,
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where ∆f1,δf1 ∈ Rm, ∆f2,δf1 ∈ Rd, andB ∈ Rd×m.
As
∥∥∆f2,δf1 (x)−B∆f1,δf1 (x)∥∥22 is convex with respect to B, its expectation, i.e. h(B), is also
convex.
Therefore, h(B) it achieves global minima when ∂h∂B = 0.
∂h
∂B
= Ex∼D
∂
∂B
(∥∥∆f2,δf1 (x)−B∆f1,δf1 (x)∥∥22)
= 2Ex∼D
[(
B∆f1,δf1 (x)−∆f2,δf1 (x)
)
∆f1,δf1 (x)
>]
= 2Ex∼D
[
B∆f1,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)
> −∆f2,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)>
]
= 2BEx∼D
[
∆f1,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)
>]− 2Ex∼D [∆f2,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)>] .
Letting ∂h∂B = 0, and denoting the solution asB
∗, we have
B∗ = Ex∼D
[
∆f2,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)
>] (Ex∼D [∆f1,δf1 (x)∆f1,δf1 (x)>])† .
Noting thatA = proj(B∗,
‖∆f2,δf1 ‖D
‖∆f1,δf1 ‖D
) is scaledB∗, we denoteA = ψB∗, where ψ a scaling factor
depending onB∗ and
‖∆f2,δf1 ‖D
‖∆f1,δf1 ‖D
. According to the definition of the projection operator, we can see
that 0 < ψ ≤ 1.
ReplacingB byA we have,
h(A) =
∥∥∆f2,δf1 −A∆f1,δf1∥∥2D = 〈∆f2,δf1 −A∆f1,δf1 ,∆f2,δf1 −A∆f1,δf1 〉D
=
∥∥∆f2,δf1∥∥2D − 〈2∆f2,δf1 −A∆f1,δf1 ,A∆f1,δf1 〉D
= (1− τ2)
∥∥∆f2,δf1∥∥2D .
It is obvious that h(A) =
∥∥∆f2,δf1 −A∆f1,δf1∥∥2D ≥ 0, thus we have τ2 ≤ 1.
As for the lower bound for τ2, we will need to use properties ofB. DenotingO as an all-zero matrix,
it holds that
h(B∗) = min
B
{h(B)} ≤ h(O). (4)
For A = ψB∗, according to the convexity of h(·) and the fact that ψ ∈ [0, 1], we can see the
following, i.e.,
h(A) = h(ψB∗) = h(ψB∗ + (1− ψ)O) ≤ ψh(B∗) + (1− ψ)h(O).
Applying (4) to the above, we can see that
h(A) ≤ h(O).
Noting that h(A) = (1− τ2)
∥∥∆f2,δf1∥∥2D and h(O) = ∥∥∆f2,δf1∥∥2D, the above inequality suggests
that
(1− τ2)
∥∥∆f2,δf1∥∥2D ≤ ∥∥∆f2,δf1∥∥2D ,
0 ≤ τ2.
Therefore, τ2 is upper bounded by 1 and lower bounded by 0.
C Proof of Theorem 1
Before actually proving the theorem, let us have a look at what τ1 and τ2 are in the case where fS
and fT are both Rn → R. In this case, both τ1 and τ2 come out in an elegant form. Let us show what
the two metrics are to have further intuition on what τ1 and τ2 characterize.
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First, let us see what the attack is in this case. As function f has one-dimensional output, its gradient
is a vector∇f ∈ Rn. Thus,
δf,(x) = arg max
‖δ‖≤
‖∇f(x)>δ‖2 = ∇f(x)‖∇f(x)‖2
Then, the τ1 becomes
τ1(x) =
〈∇fS(x),∇fT (x)〉2
‖∇fS(x)‖22 · ‖∇fT (x)‖22
which is the squared cosine (angle) between two gradients.
For τ2, the matrixA degenerates to a scalar constant
A =
〈∆fT ,δfS ,∆fS ,δfS 〉D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D
,
and the second metric becomes
τfS→fT2 =
〈∆fS ,δfS ,∆fT ,δfS 〉2D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D · ‖∆fT ,δfS ‖2D
We can see, it is interestingly in the same form of the first metric τ1. We will simply use τ2 to denote
τfS→fT2 afterwards.
Theorem 1 (Restated). For two functions fS and fT that both are Rn → R, there is an affine
function g : R→ R, so that
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D = Ex∼D
[
(1− τ1(x)τ2)‖∇fT (x)‖22
]
,
where g is defined as g(x) = Ax+ Const.
Moreover, if assuming that fT is L-Lipschitz continuous, i.e., ‖∇fT (x)‖2 ≤ L for ∀x ∈ supp(D),
we can have a more elegant statement:
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D ≤ (1− τ1τ2)L2.
Proof. In the case where g is a one-dimensional affine function, we write is as g(z) = Az+ b, where
A is defined in the definition of τ2 (Definition 3). In this case, it enjoys a simple form of
A =
〈∆fT ,δfS ,∆fS ,δfS 〉D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D
.
Then, we can see that
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D = ‖∇fT −A∇fS‖2D
= Ex∼D
[‖∇fT (x)−A∇fS(x)‖22] . (5)
To continue, we split ∇fT as two terms, i.e., one on the direction on ∇fS and one orthogonal to
∇fS .
Denoting φ(x) as the angle between∇fT (x) and ∇fS(x) in Euclidean space, we have
∇fT (x) = cos(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2‖∇fS(x)‖2∇fS(x) +∇fT (x)− cos(φ(x))
‖∇fT (x)‖2
‖∇fS(x)‖2∇fS(x)
= cos(φ(x))
‖∇fT (x)‖2
‖∇fS(x)‖2∇fS(x) + v(x), (6)
where we denote v(x) = ∇fT (x)− cos(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2‖∇fS(x)‖2∇fS(x) for notation convenience.
We can see that v(x) is orthogonal to ∇fS(x), thus ‖v(x)‖2 =
√
1− cos2(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2.
Recall that actually τ1(x) = cos2(φ(x)), it can be written as ‖v(x)‖2 =
√
1− τ1(x)‖∇fT (x)‖2.
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Then, plugging (6) into (5) we have
(5) = Ex∼D
[
‖ cos(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2‖∇fS(x)‖2∇fS(x) + v(x)−A∇fS(x)‖
2
2
]
= Ex∼D
[∥∥∥∥(cos(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2‖∇fS(x)‖2 −A
)
∇fS(x) + v(x)
∥∥∥∥2
2
]
= Ex∼D
[∥∥∥∥(cos(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2‖∇fS(x)‖2 −A
)
∇fS(x)
∥∥∥∥2
2
+ ‖v(x)‖22
]
= Ex∼D
[∥∥∥∥(cos(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2‖∇fS(x)‖2 −A
)
∇fS(x)
∥∥∥∥2
2
+ (1− τ1(x))‖∇fT (x)‖22
]
= Ex∼D
[∥∥∥∥(cos(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2‖∇fS(x)‖2 −A
)
∇fS(x)
∥∥∥∥2
2
]
+ Ex∼D(1− τ1(x))‖∇fT (x)‖22
= Ex∼D
[(
cos(φ(x))
‖∇fT (x)‖2
‖∇fS(x)‖2 −A
)2
‖∇fS(x)‖22
]
+ Ex∼D(1− τ1(x))‖∇fT (x)‖22.
(7)
Now let us deal with the first term by plugging in
A =
〈∆fT ,δfS ,∆fS ,δfS 〉D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D
,
where ∆fT ,δfS (x) =  cos(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2 and ∆fS ,δfS (x) = ‖∇fS(x)‖2, and we have
Ex∼D
(
cos(φ(x))
‖∇fT (x)‖2
‖∇fS(x)‖2 −A
)2
‖∇fS(x)‖22
= Ex∼D (cos(φ(x))‖∇fT (x)‖2 −A ‖∇fS(x)‖2)2
=
1
2
Ex∼D
(
∆fT ,δfS (x)−A∆fS ,δfS (x)
)2
=
1
2
Ex∼D
(
∆fT ,δfS (x)
2 +A2∆fS ,δfS (x)
2 − 2A∆fT ,δfS (x)∆fS ,δfS (x)
)
=
1
2
(∥∥∥∆fT ,δfS ∥∥∥2D +A2 ∥∥∥∆fS ,δfS ∥∥∥2D − 2A〈∆fT ,δfS ,∆fS ,δfS 〉D
)
=
1
2
(∥∥∥∆fT ,δfS ∥∥∥2D + 〈∆fT ,δfS ,∆fS ,δfS 〉
2
D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D
− 2 〈∆fT ,δfS ,∆fS ,δfS 〉
2
D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D
)
=
∥∥∥∆fT ,δfS ∥∥∥2D
2
(
1− 〈∆fT ,δfS ,∆fS ,δfS 〉
2
D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D · ‖∆fT ,δfS ‖2D
)
= (1− τ2)Ex∼D
[
cos2(x)‖∇fT (x)‖22
]
= (1− τ2)Ex∼D
[
τ1(x)‖∇fT (x)‖22
]
. (8)
Plugging (8) into (7), we finally have
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D
= (1− τ2)Ex∼D
[
τ1(x)‖∇fT (x)‖22
]
+ Ex∼D(1− τ1(x))‖∇fT (x)‖22
= Ex∼D
[
(1− τ2τ1(x))‖∇fT (x)‖22
]
≤ (1− τ1τ2)L2,
which completes the proof.
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D Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 (Restated). For two functions fS : Rn → Rm, and fT : Rn → Rd, there is an affine
function g : Rm → Rd, so that
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D ≤ 5Ex∼D

(
(1− τ1(x)τ2) + (1− τ1(x))(1− τ2)λfT (x)2
) ‖∇fT (x)‖22
+ (λfT (x) + λfS (x))
2 ‖∇fS(x)‖22
‖∇fS‖2D,2
‖∇fT ‖2D,2
 ,
where g is defined as g(z) = Az +Const.
Moreover, if assuming that fT is L-Lipschitz continuous, i.e., ‖∇fT (x)‖2 ≤ L for ∀x ∼ supp(D),
and considering the worst-case singular value ratio λ, we can have a more elegant statement:
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D ≤
(
(1− τ1τ2) + (1− τ1)(1− τ2)λ2fT + (λfT + λfS )2
)
5L2.
Proof. Recall that the matrixA is defined in Definition 3, i.e.,
A = proj(Ex∼D[∆fT ,δfS (x)∆fS ,δfS (x)
>]
(
Ex∼D[∆fS ,δfS (x)∆fS ,δfS (x)
>]
)†
,
‖∆fT ,δfS ‖D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖D
),
and we can see
‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖2D,2 = ‖∇f>T −∇(g ◦ fS)>‖2D,2 = ‖∇f>T −A∇f>S ‖2D,2
= Ex∼D‖∇fT (x)> −A∇fS(x)>‖22
= Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1
‖∇fT (x)>t−A∇fS(x)>t‖22, (9)
where the last equality is due to the definition of matrix spectral norm.
Denoting∇f> as either the Jacobian matrix∇f>T or∇f>S , Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
suggests that ∇f(x)> = UΣV >, where Σ is a diagonal matrix containing all singular values
ordered by their absolute values. Let σ1, · · · , σn denote ordered singular values. Nothing that the
number of singular values that are non-zero may be less than n, so we fill the empty with zeros, such
that each of them have corresponding singular vectors, i.e., the column vectors v1, · · · ,vn in V .
That is being said, ∀i ∈ [n], we have
‖∇f(x)>vi‖2 = |σi|.
Let θi and vi denote the singular values and vectors for ∇fS(x)>. Noting that {vi}ni=1 define a
orthonormal basis for Rn, we can represent
t =
n∑
i=1
θivi, (10)
where
∑n
i=1 θ
2
i = 1.
As adversarial attack is about the largest eigenvalue of the gradient, plugging (10) into (9), we can
split it into two parts, i.e.,
(9) = Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1
∥∥∥∥∥∇fT (x)>
(
n∑
i=1
θivi
)
−A∇fS(x)>
(
n∑
i=1
θivi
)∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
= Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∇fT (x)> (θ1v1)−A∇fS(x)> (θ1v1)
+∇fT (x)>
(
n∑
i=2
θivi
)
−A∇fS(x)>
(
n∑
i=2
θivi
)∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
. (11)
Denoting u =
∑n
i=2 θivi, we can see this vector is orthogonal to v1. Let us denote v
′
1 as the singular
vector with the biggest absolute singular value of ∇fT (x)>, parallel with attack δfT . Now we split
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u = u1 + u2 into two terms, where u1 is parallel to v′1, and u2 is orthogonal to u1. As u1 is in the
orthogonal space to v1 while parallel with v′1, it is bounded by the sine value of the angle between v1
and v′1, i.e.,
√
1− τ1(x). Hence, noting that u is part of the unit vector t,
‖u1‖2 ≤
√
1− τ1(x)‖u‖2 ≤
√
1− τ1(x). (12)
Plugging u in (11), we have
(11) = Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1
∥∥∥∥∥∇fT (x)> (θ1v1)−A∇fS(x)> (θ1v1)+∇fT (x)> (u1 + u2)−A∇fS(x)>u
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≤ Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1

∥∥∇fT (x)> (θ1v1)−A∇fS(x)> (θ1v1)∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
X1
+
∥∥∇fT (x)>u1∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
X2
+
∥∥∇fT (x)>u2 −A∇fS(x)>u∥∥2︸ ︷︷ ︸
X3

2
, (13)
where the inequality is due to triangle inequality.
There are three terms we have to deal with, i.e., X1, X2 and X3. Regarding the first term, v1 in X1
aligns with the attack δfS (x), which we have known through adversarial attack. The second term X2
is trivially bounded by (12). Although adversarial attacks tell us nothing about X3, it can be bounded
by the second largest singular values.
Let us first deal with two easiest, i.e., X2 and X3. Applying (12) on X2 directly, we have
X2 = ‖∇fT (x)>‖2 · ‖u1‖2 ≤
√
1− τ1(x)‖∇fT (x)>‖2.
For X3, noting that u2 is orthogonal to v′1, and u is orthogonal to v1, we can see that u2 has no
components of the largest absolute singular vector of ∇fT (x)>, and u has no components of the
largest absolute singular vector of∇fT (x)>. Therefore,
X3 ≤
∥∥∇fT (x)>u2∥∥2 + ∥∥A∇fS(x)>u∥∥2
≤ σfT ,2(x) ‖u2‖2 + σfS ,2(x) ‖A‖2 ‖u‖2
= λfT (x)
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥2 ‖u2‖2 + λfS (x)∥∥∇fS(x)>∥∥2 ‖A‖2 ‖u‖2
≤ λfT (x)
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥2 + λfS (x)∥∥∇fS(x)>∥∥2 ‖A‖2 ,
where the first inequality is due to triangle inequality, the second inequity is done by the attributes
of singular values, and the definition of matrix 2-norm. The equality is done simply by applying
the definition of singular values ratio (Definition 4), and the third inequality is due to the fact that
‖u2‖2 ≤ ‖u‖2 ≤ 1.
Before dealing with X1, let us simplify (13) by relax the square of summed terms to sum of squared
terms, as the following.
(13) = Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1
(X1 +X2 +X3)
2
= Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1
X21 +X
2
2 +X
2
3 + 2X1X2 + 2X2X3 + 2X1X3
≤ Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1X
2
1 +X
2
2 +X
2
3 + 2 max{X21 , X22}+ 2 max{X22 , X23}+ 2 max{X21 , X23}
≤ Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1X
2
1 +X
2
2 +X
2
3 + 2(X
2
1 +X
2
2 ) + 2(X
2
2 +X
2
3 ) + 2(X
2
1 +X
2
3 )
= Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1
5(X21 +X
2
2 +X
2
3 ). (14)
We note that this relaxation is not necessary, but simply for the simplicity of the final results without
breaking what our theory suggests.
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Bring what we we have about X2 and X3, and noting that θ1 ≤ 1 depends on t, we can drop the max
operation by
(14) = Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1
5(X21 +X
2
2 +X
2
3 )
= Ex∼D max‖t‖2=1
5(
∥∥∇fT (x)> (θ1v1)−A∇fS(x)> (θ1v1)∥∥22 +X22 +X23 )
≤ 5Ex∼D
 ∥∥∇fT (x)>v1 −A∇fS(x)>v1∥∥22 + (1− τ1(x)) ‖∇fT (x)‖22
+
(
(λfT (x) + λfS (x))
∥∥∇fS(x)>∥∥2 ‖A‖2)2 .
 (15)
Now, let us deal with the first term. As v1 is a unit vector and is in fact the direction of fS(x)’s
adversarial attack, we can write δfS ,(x) = v1. Hence,
Ex∼D
∥∥∇fT (x)>v1 −A∇fS(x)>v1∥∥22
= Ex∼D
1
2
∥∥∇fT (x)>δfS ,(x)−A∇fS(x)>δfS ,(x)∥∥22
= Ex∼D
1
2
∥∥∥∆fT ,δfS (x)−A∆fS ,δfS (x)∥∥∥22 , (16)
where the last equality is derived by applying the definition of ∆(x), i.e., equation (1). Note that we
omit the  in δfS , for notation simplicity.
The matrix A is deigned to minimize (16), as shown in the proof of Proposition 1. Expanding the
term we have
(16) =
1
2
Ex∼D
[∥∥∥∆fT ,δfS (x)∥∥∥22 + ∥∥∥A∆fS ,δfS (x)∥∥∥22 − 2〈∆fT ,δfS (x),A∆fS ,δfS (x)〉
]
=
1
2
(∥∥∥∆fT ,δfS ∥∥∥2D + ∥∥∥A∆fS ,δfS ∥∥∥2D − 2〈∆fT ,δfS ,A∆fS ,δfS 〉D
)
=
∥∥∥∆fT ,δfS ∥∥∥2D
2
(1− τ2)
= (1− τ2)Ex∼D
∥∥∇fT (x)>v1∥∥22 . (17)
Recall that v1 is a unit vector aligns the direction of δfS , and we have used v
′
1 to denote a unit vector
that aligns the direction of δfT . As τ1 tells us about the angle between the two, let us split v1 into
to orthogonal vectors, i.e., v1 =
√
τ1(x)v
′
1 +
√
1− τ1(x)v′1,⊥, where v′1,⊥ is a unit vector that is
orthogonal to v′1.
Plugging this into (17) we have
(17) = (1− τ2)Ex∼D
∥∥∥∇fT (x)>(√τ1(x)v′1 +√1− τ1(x)v′1,⊥)∥∥∥2
2
= (1− τ2)Ex∼D
[∥∥∥∇fT (x)>√τ1(x)v′1∥∥∥2
2
+
∥∥∥∇fT (x)>√1− τ1(x)v′1,⊥∥∥∥2
2
]
= (1− τ2)Ex∼D
[
τ1(x)
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22 + (1− τ1(x))λfT (x)2 ∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22] ,
where the second equality is due to the image of v′1 and v
′
1,⊥ after linear transformation∇fT (x)>
are orthogonal, which can be easily observed through SVD.
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Plugging this in (15), and with some regular algebra manipulation, finally we have
(15) = 5Ex∼D

(1− τ2)
[
τ1(x)
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22 + (1− τ1(x))λfT (x)2 ∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22]
+(1− τ1(x)) ‖∇fT (x)‖22
+ (λfT (x) + λfS (x))
2 ∥∥∇fS(x)>∥∥22 ‖A‖22

= 5Ex∼D

(1− τ1(x)τ2)
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22
+(1− τ1(x))(1− τ2)λfT (x)2
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22
+ (λfT (x) + λfS (x))
2 ∥∥∇fS(x)>∥∥22 ‖A‖22
 . (18)
Recall thatA is from a norm-restricted matrix space, i.e., theA is scaled so that its spectral norm is
no greater than
‖∆fT ,δfS ‖D
‖∆fS,δfS ‖D
, thus
‖A‖22 ≤
‖∆fT ,δfS ‖2D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D
≤ ‖∆fT ,δfT ‖
2
D
‖∆fS ,δfS ‖2D
=
Ex∼D‖∆fT ,δfT (x)‖22
Ex∼D‖∆fS ,δfS (x)‖22
=
Ex∼D‖∇f>T (x)‖22
Ex∼D‖∇f>S (x)‖22
=
‖∇f>T ‖2D,2
‖∇f>S ‖2D,2
. (19)
Hence, plugging the above inequality to (18), the first statement of the theorem is proven, i.e.,
(18) ≤ 5Ex∼D

(1− τ1(x)τ2)
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22
+(1− τ1(x))(1− τ2)λ2fT
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22
+ (λfT (x) + λfS (x))
2 ∥∥∇fS(x)>∥∥22 ‖∇f>T ‖2D,2‖∇f>S ‖2D,2
 . (20)
To see the second statement of the theorem, we assume fT is L-Lipschitz continuous, i.e.,
‖∇fT (x)‖2 ≤ L for ∀x ∈ supp(D), and considering the worst-case singular value ratio
λ = maxx∈supp(D) for either fS , fT , we can continue as
(20) ≤ 5

Ex∼D
[
(1− τ1(x)τ2)
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22]
+Ex∼D
[
(1− τ1(x))(1− τ2)λ2fT
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22]
+Ex∼D
[
(λfT + λfS )
2 ∥∥∇fS(x)>∥∥22 ‖∇f>T ‖2D,2‖∇f>S ‖2D,2
]

= 5

Ex∼D
[
(1− τ1(x)τ2)
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22]
+Ex∼D
[
(1− τ1(x))(1− τ2)λ2fT
∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22]
+ (λfT + λfS )
2 ‖∇f>T ‖2D,2

= 5Ex∼D
(
(1− τ1(x)τ2) + (1− τ1(x))(1− τ2)λ2fT + (λfT + λfS )2
)∥∥∇fT (x)>∥∥22
≤ Ex∼D
(
(1− τ1(x)τ2) + (1− τ1(x))(1− τ2)λ2fT + (λfT + λfS )2
)
5L2
=
(
(1− τ1τ2) + (1− τ1)(1− τ2)λ2fT + (λfT + λfS )2
)
5L2,
where the first inequality is due to the definition of worst-case singular value ratio, the last inequality
is by Lipschitz condition, and the last equality is done be simply applying the definition of τ1.
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E Proof of Theorem 3
The idea for proving Theorem 3 is straight-forward: bounded gradients difference implies bounded
function difference, and then bounded function difference implies bounded loss difference.
To begin with, let us prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Without loss of generality we assume ‖x‖2 ≤ 1 for ∀x ∈ supp(D). Consider functions
fS : Rn → Rm, fT : Rn → Rd, and an affine function g : Rm → Rd, suggested by Theorem 1 or
Theorem 2, such that g(fS(0)) = fT (0), if both fT , fS are β-smooth in {x | ‖x‖ ≤ 1}, we have
‖fT − g ◦ fS‖D ≤ ‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖D,2 +
(
1 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2
)
β.
Proof. Let us denote v(x) = fT (x)− g ◦ fS(x), and we can show the smoothness of v(·).
As g(·) is an affine function satisfying g(fS(0)) = fT (0), it can be denoted as g(z) = A(z −
fS(0)) + fT (0), whereA is a matrix suggested by Theorem 1 or Theorem 2. Therefore, denoting
B1 = {x | ‖x‖ ≤ 1} as a unit ball, for ∀x,y ∈ B1 it holds that
‖∇v(x)−∇v(y)‖2 =
∥∥∇v(x)> −∇v(y)>∥∥
2
=
∥∥∇fT (x)> −∇fT (y)> −A(∇fS(x)> −∇fS(y)>)∥∥2
≤ ∥∥∇fT (x)> −∇fT (y)>∥∥2 + ∥∥A(∇fS(x)> −∇fS(y)>)∥∥2
≤ ∥∥∇fT (x)> −∇fT (y)>∥∥2 + ‖A‖2 ∥∥∇fS(x)> −∇fS(y)>∥∥2 , (21)
where the last second inequality is due to triangle inequality, and the last inequality is by the property
of spectral norm.
Applying the β-smoothness of fS and fT , and noting that ‖A‖2 ≤ ‖∇fT ‖D,2‖∇fS‖D,2 as shown in (19), we
can continue as
(21) ≤ β ‖x− y‖2 + ‖A‖2 β ‖x− y‖2 ≤ β ‖x− y‖2 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2 β ‖x− y‖2
=
(
1 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2
)
β ‖x− y‖2 ,
which suggests that v(·) is
(
1 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2
)
β-smooth.
We are ready to prove the lemma now. Applying the mean value theorem, for ∀x ∈ B1, we have
v(x)− v(0) = ∇v(ξx)>x,
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is a scalar number. Subtracting∇v(x)>x on both sides give
v(x)− v(0)−∇v(x)>x = (∇v(ξx)−∇v(x))>x∥∥v(x)− v(0)−∇v(x)>x∥∥
2
=
∥∥(∇v(ξx)−∇v(x))>x∥∥
2∥∥v(x)− v(0)−∇v(x)>x∥∥
2
≤ ‖(∇v(ξx)−∇v(x))‖2 ‖x‖2 .
Let us denote β1 =
(
1 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2
)
β for notation convenience, and apply the definition of smooth-
ness:
‖v(x)− v(0)−∇v(x)>x‖2 ≤ β1(1− ξ)‖x‖22 ≤ β1. (22)
Noting that v(0) = 0 and applying the triangle inequality, we have
‖v(x)− v(0)−∇v(x)>x‖2 ≥ ‖v(x)‖2 − ‖∇v(x)>x‖2 ≥ ‖v(x)‖2 − ‖∇v(x)>‖2
Plugging it into (22), we have
‖v(x)‖2 ≤ β1 + ‖∇v(x)>‖2
‖v(x)‖22 ≤ β21 + ‖∇v(x)>‖22 + 2β1‖∇v(x)>‖2
Ex∼D‖v(x)‖22 ≤ β21 + Ex∼D‖∇v(x)>‖22 + 2β1Ex∼D‖∇v(x)>‖2
Ex∼D‖v(x)‖22 ≤ β21 + Ex∼D‖∇v(x)‖22 + 2β1Ex∼D‖∇v(x)‖2
‖v‖2D ≤ β21 + ‖∇v‖2D,2 + 2β1Ex∼D‖∇v(x)‖2
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Applying Jensen’s inequality to the last term, we get
‖v‖2D ≤ β21 + ‖∇v‖2D,2 + 2β1
√
Ex∼D‖∇v(x)‖22
= β21 + ‖∇v‖2D,2 + 2β1
√
‖∇v‖2D,2 = β21 + ‖∇v‖2D,2 + 2β1‖∇v‖D,2
= (‖∇v‖D,2 + β1)2
Plugging β1 =
(
1 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2
)
β and v = fT − g ◦ fS into the above inequality completes the
proof.
With the above lemma, it is easy to show the mean squared loss on the transferred model is also
bounded.
Theorem 3 (Restated). Without loss of generality we assume ‖x‖2 ≤ 1 for ∀x ∈ supp(D). Consider
functions fS : Rn → Rm, fT : Rn → Rd, and an affine function g : Rm → Rd, suggested by
Theorem 1 or Theorem 2, such that g(fS(0)) = fT (0). If both fT , fS are β-smooth, then
‖g ◦ fS − y‖2D ≤
(
‖fT − y‖D + ‖∇fT −∇g ◦ fS‖D,2 +
(
1 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2
)
β
)2
Proof. Let us denote β1 =
(
1 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2
)
β, and according to Lemma 1 we can see
‖fT − g ◦ fS‖D ≤ ‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖D,2 + β1 (23)
Applying a standard algebra manipulation to the left hand side, and then applying triangle inequality,
we have
‖fT − g ◦ fS‖D = ‖fT − y + y − g ◦ fS‖D ≥ ‖y − g ◦ fS‖D − ‖fT − y‖D.
Plugging this directly into (23), it holds that
‖y − g ◦ fS‖D − ‖fT − y‖D ≤ ‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖D,2 + β1
‖y − g ◦ fS‖D ≤ ‖fT − y‖D + ‖∇fT −∇(g ◦ fS)‖D,2 + β1
Replacing β1 by
(
1 +
‖∇fT ‖D,2
‖∇fS‖D,2
)
β and taking the square, we can see Theorem 3 is proven.
F Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 (Restated). If LT is mean squared loss, fT achieves zero loss, and the attack recovers
the virtual adversarial attack within an -ball (Definition 1), the empirical adversarial transferability
defined in (2) is approximately upper and lower bounded by
LT (fT ◦ PGDfS ; y,D) ≥ 2Ex∼D
[
τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22
]
+O(3),
LT (fT ◦ PGDfS ; y,D) ≤ 2Ex∼D
[(
λ2fT + (1− λ2fT )τ1(x)
) ‖∇fT (x)‖22]+O(3),
where O(3) denotes a cubic error term. We can see that as τ1(x) becomes larger, both the lower
and upper bound become larger.
Proof. Recall that the empirical adversarial transferability is defined as a loss
LT (fT ◦ PGDfS ; y,D) = Ex∼D `T (fT (PGDfS (x)), y(x)).
As LT is mean squared loss, and fT achieves zero loss, i.e., fT = y, we have
LsT (fT ◦ PGDfS ; y,D) = Ex∼D ‖fT (PGDfS (x))− y(x)‖22
= Ex∼D ‖fT (PGDfS (x))− fT (x)‖22 . (24)
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If PGDfS recovers the virtual adversarial attack within an -ball, it means that
PGDfS (x) = x+ δfS ,(x).
Plugging this in and it becomes
(24) = Ex∼D ‖fT (x+ δfS ,(x))− fT (x)‖22 .
Denoting δfS ,(x) = δfS ,1(x), and define an auxiliary function h as
h(t) = fT (x+ tδfS ,1(x))− fT (x),
we can see that ‖fT (x+ δfS ,(x))− fT (x)‖22 = ‖h()‖22.
We can then apply Taylor expansion to approximate h() with a second order error term O(2), i.e.,
h() =
∂h
∂t
∣∣
t=0
+O(2) = ∇fT (x)>δfS ,1 +O(2).
Therefore, assuming that ‖∇fT (x)‖2 is bounded for x ∈ supp(D), we have
‖fT (x+ δfS ,(x))− fT (x)‖22 = ‖h()‖22 = 2
∥∥∇fT (x)>δfS ,1(x)∥∥22 +O(3), (25)
where we have omit higher order error term, i.e., O(4).
Next, let us deal with the term
∥∥∇fT (x)>δfS ,1(x)∥∥22. Same us the technique we use in the proof
of Theorem 2, we split δfS ,1(x) = v1 + v2, where v1 aligns the direction of δfT ,1(x), and v2 is
orthogonal to v1. Noting that τ1(x) is the squared cosine of the angle between δfS ,1(x) and δfT ,1(x),
we can see that
‖v1‖22 = τ1(x) ‖δfS ,1(x)‖22 = τ1(x),
‖v2‖22 = (1− τ1(x)) ‖δfS ,1(x)‖22 = (1− τ1(x)).
Therefore, we can continue as∥∥∇fT (x)>δfS ,1(x)∥∥22 = ∥∥∇fT (x)>(v1 + v2)∥∥22
=
∥∥∇fT (x)>v1∥∥22 + ∥∥∇fT (x)>v2∥∥22
= τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 +
∥∥∇fT (x)>v2∥∥22 , (26)
where the second equality is because that v1 is corresponding to the largest singular value of
∇fT (x)>, and v2 is orthogonal to v1.
Next, we derive the lower bound and upper bound for (26). The lower bounded can be derived as
τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 +
∥∥∇fT (x)>v2∥∥22 ≥ τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 ,
and the upper bounded can be derived as
τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 +
∥∥∇fT (x)>v2∥∥22 ≤ τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 + λfT (x)2 ‖∇fT (x)‖22 ‖v2‖22
= τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 + λfT (x)2 ‖∇fT (x)‖22 (1− τ1(x))
≤ τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 + λ2fT ‖∇fT (x)‖22 (1− τ1(x))
=
(
λ2fT + (1− λ2fT )τ1(x)
) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 ,
where λfT (x) is the singular value ratio of fT at x, and λfT is the maximal singular value of fT .
Applying the lower and upper bound to (25), we finally have
‖fT (x+ δfS ,(x))− fT (x)‖22 ≥ 2τ1(x) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 +O(3),
‖fT (x+ δfS ,(x))− fT (x)‖22 ≤ 2
(
λ2fT + (1− λ2fT )τ1(x)
) ‖∇fT (x)‖22 +O(3). (27)
Noting that
LsT (fT ◦ PGDfS ; y,D) = Ex∼D ‖fT (x+ δfS ,(x))− fT (x)‖22 ,
we can see that taking expectation to (27) completes the proof.
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G Experiment Details
All experiments are conducted on 4 RTX 2080 Ti GPUs and in python3 Ubuntu 16.04 environment.
G.1 Adversarial Transferability Indicates Knowledge-transfer among Data Distributions
Details of Model Training To provide a fair comparison, we train five source models on the five
source datasets from 0% animals to 100% animals, and one reference models on STL-10 with
identical architectures and hyperparameters. We use SGD optimizer and standard cross-entropy loss
with learning rate 0.1, momentum 0.9, and weight decay 10−4. Each model is trained for 300 epochs.
G.2 Adversarial Transferability Indicating Knowledge-transfer among Attributes
Details of Model Training We train 40 binary source classifiers on each of the 40 attributes of
CelebA with ResNet18 [21]. All the classifiers are trained with optimizer Adadelta with a learning
rate of 1.0 for 14 epochs. We also train a facial recognition model as a reference model on CelebA
with 10,177 identities using ResNet18 as the controlled experiment.The reference facial recognition
model is optimized with SGD and initial learning rate 0.1 on the ArcFace [9] with focal loss [37] for
125 epochs. For each source model, we construct a transferred model by stripping off the last layers
and attaching a facial recognition head without parameters. Then we use the 40 transferred models to
evaluate the knowledge transferability on 7 facial recognition benchmarks.
G.3 Adversarial Transferability Indicating Knowledge-transfer among Tasks
Details of Model Training We use 15 pretrained models released in the task bank [82] as the source
models. Each source model consists of two parts, an encoder, and a decoder. The encoder is a modified
ResNet50 without pooling, homogeneous across all tasks, whereas the decoder is customized to suit
the output of each task. When measuring the adversarial transferability, we will use each source
model as a reference model and compute the transferability matrix as described below.
Adversarial Transferability Matrix (ATM) is used here to measure the adversarial transferability
between multiple tasks. In the experiment of determining similarity among tasks, it is hard to
compare directly and fairly, since each task is of different loss functions, which is usually in a very
different scale with each other. To solve this problem, we take the same ordinal normalization
approach as [82]. Suppose we have N tasks in the pool, a tournament matrix MT for each task
T is constructed, where the element of the matrix mi,j represents what percentages of adversarial
examples generated from the ith task transfers better to task T than the ones of the jth task (untargeted
attack success rate is used here). Then we take the principal eigenvectors of the N tournament
matrices and stack them together to build the N ×N adversarial transferability matrix.
Figure 6: We also quantitatively compare our prediction with the Taskonomy [82] prediction when
different number of categories is enforced. We find our prediction is similar with theirs with n ≥ 3.
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